Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mention philosophy: the mention of linguistic objects must be distinguished from their use. This distinction is sometimes difficult when symbols are partly used and partly mentioned within logical formulas. One simple case of a mention of a word or phrase is the quote. See also object language, metalanguage, quote, reference, occurrence, type, token._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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H. Wessel on Mention - Dictionary of Arguments
I 220 Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. >Mention/use, >Use, >Levels/order, >Metalanguage, >Object language. I 286 Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content). >Consequence. Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field). ((s)Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related? Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".) I 313 ((s) Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object, 2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object Inselsberg: is mentioned - name: is used. Mention: = quote (quotes). Instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A". I 352 Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B. 2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term. (s) A sound cannot be true or false. ad I 352 ((s) Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.) I 35 "Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part. >Odd sense, >Odd meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege. Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts. >Extensionality, >Extensions. Wessel: the extensionality rule is here not applicable. - Because intensional rules are very similar to extensional ones, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements. I 353 Planets example /Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence. Only identity sentences: evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Identity, >Morning star/evening star, >Planets example. WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28